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Abstract. Incomplete and incorrect requirements may cause the safety-related 
software systems to fail to achieve their safety goals. It is crucial to ensure 
software safety by identifying proper software safety requirements during the 
requirements elicitation activity. Practitioners apply various Safety Risk 
Assessment Techniques (SRATs) to identify, analyze and assess safety risk. 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of guidance on how appropriate SRATs and safety 
process can be integrated into requirements elicitation activity to bridge the gap 
between the safety and requirements engineering practices. In this research, we 
proposed an Integration Framework that integrates safety activities and techniques 
into existing requirements elicitation activity. 
Keywords. Safety risk assessment techniques; elicitation; software safety process; 
requirements engineering; process integration 
Introduction 
Over recent years, there has been a drastic increase in the number of software usage in 
safety-related systems. Several safety-related systems such as traffic control, medical 
devices, smart vehicles, nuclear power plant or railway signaling systems depend on 
software to manage the safety-related functionalities [1-4]. The demand for software in 
safety-related system is expected to increase in the following years which turned out to 
be a challenge in the software safety and requirements engineering processes [5]. 
Potential software safety hazards may lead to environmental problems, serious injury to 
people or a loss of human life. It can be seen from several examples such as the 
radiation overdose in THERAC-25 [4], the explosion of Ariane 5 shortly after the 
launch [3], and thousands of software errors were found in Voyager and Galileo 
spacecraft [6].  These incidents are caused by software requirements issues such as 
having an improper requirements specification, miscommunication of the requirements 
between operators and the development teams [1,3,4,6]. As a result, software safety 
becomes a vital concern throughout the requirements engineering process.   
A recent survey [7] conducted by the industrial safety experts shows that there is a 
strong interrelation between safety and requirements engineering (RE) whereby the 
requirements defined in RE process are handed to the safety engineers for safety hazard 
analyses. These two processes collaborate iteratively once there are changes in the 
requirements. Thus, there is a need for a better collaboration between the safety 
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engineering teams and the requirements engineering teams to transform the safety goals 
into appropriate safety-related requirements and also to verify and validate 
requirements specifications from safety perspectives. 
In brief, the overall RE [8-10] process consists of five main activities: 
requirements elicitation, requirements negotiation and requirements documentation, 
requirements verification and validation (V&V) and requirements management. These 
RE activities worked intertwiningly to produce system requirements. Software safety 
risks assessment and software safety requirements elicitation are two key elements to 
ensure the overall safety of software intensive systems. Safety Risk Assessment 
Techniques (SRATs) are used to identify, analyse system hazards and evaluate safety 
risks during requirements elicitation. SRATs are applied to ensure that potential safety 
hazards that pose risks to the software intensive system are identified, mitigated and 
eliminated. The safety engineers select and apply various SRATs based on the 
guidelines from the existing standards or specific requests from their clients. For 
example, SRATs such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA), Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) are well-known techniques 
for assessing software hazards and risk of the safety-related systems. The work 
products developed from the safety risk analysis performed by the safety engineering 
team are used as the inputs by the requirements engineering team to elicit safety-related 
requirements. Although there are a variety of SRATs available, not all of the 
techniques are suitable to be applied during requirements elicitation. Therefore, by 
integrating appropriate SRATs into requirements elicitation activity, this will help both 
teams working together to develop safety-related requirements. 
This research aims to help safety and requirements engineers to have a better 
understanding of the relationships between SRATs, software safety process and 
requirements elicitation activity. A framework is proposed to integrate the software 
safety activities and SRATs into the existing elicitation activity. The proposed work, 
Safety Risk Assessment Techniques in Requirements Elicitation (SaTRE) Integration 
Framework is derived by reviewing literature and conducting a survey to identify and 
select appropriate SRATs and activities that are relevant to software safety 
requirements elicitation. Subsequently, the selected SRATs, safety activities and steps 
were mapped into three stages of the requirements elicitation activity (i.e. pre-
elicitation, midst of elicitation, and post-elicitation). The framework is evaluated by 
experts and researchers from requirements and safety engineering domains. 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 1 discusses work 
related to this research. Section 2 discusses the selection of SRATs and safety process 
activities. Section 3 presents the proposed framework. Section 4 discusses limitations 
and applicability of the framework arising from the evaluation. Finally, Section 5 
presents conclusions and discusses future research. 
1. Related work 
A recent work by Firesmith [11] describes the importance of integrating defensibility 
(i.e. safety and security) quality into requirements engineering and also highlights the 
needs of having proper concepts, techniques, tools and expertise to support the 
collaboration between safety, security, and requirements engineers. Kotonya and 
Sommerville [12] propose an integration of safety analysis and VORD (Viewpoint-
Oriented Requirements Definition) which illustrates how the VORD process model can 
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improve the process of deriving safety requirements. Besides emphasizing that safety 
should be built into the early software development process, the authors also show the 
concept of collaboration between safety and RE. However, currently both works have 
not considered integrating the SRATs into requirements elicitation activity.  
There are some existing safety standards such as IEC61508 [13] and IEC62279 
[14] that provides guidelines for SRATs and also the inputs (information or artefacts) 
needed by and the outputs (the temporary, intermediate or final products) created or 
modified in each software development phase. Although SRATs have been 
recommended in these standards, there is still a lack of guidance to support safety and 
requirements engineers to understand how these techniques can be applied during the 
requirements phase to elicit software safety requirements. Software safety handbook 
[15] and software safety guidebook [16] provide the overall software safety analysis 
activities with inputs and outputs for each SRATs but do not provide further 
elaboration between safety analysis activities and techniques and also the requirements 
elicitation activity.  
Allenby and Kelly combine the concept of use case scenarios from Unified 
Modelling Language (UML) together with the Functional Hazard Assessment (FHA) 
technique to derive the requirements for safety critical aeroengine control systems [17]. 
This research focuses on utilising the output produced by the elicitation activity (i.e. the 
use case scenarios) with the FHA approach. More detailed modelling of the process 
elements (e.g. inputs, outputs, roles, activities) can help both requirements and safety 
engineering teams to have a better understanding of the relationship between the 
SRATs and the software safety-related requirements elicitation activity. 
2. Selection of SRATs and Activities 
The research methodology that we used in selecting SRATs consists of the following 
three phases. 
2.1. Phase I: Identifying and Selecting SRATs and Activities 
In Phase I, we have reviewed the safety standards and literature [14,17,31-33] to 
identify a list of SRATs and safety activities with regard to software requirements 
elicitation. Next, we have chosen SRATs and activities that are suitable for the 
integration purpose. There are many SRATs suggested by safety standards and also 
literature to assure software safety. The criteria that we used to determine the 
appropriateness of the SRATs for software safety requirements elicitation are as 
follows:-  
 Hazard Identification (HAZID) - Techniques that can be used to identify 
potential hazards in the software safety systems  
 Hazard Analysis (HA) - Techniques that focus more on assessing the potential 
effects and causes of hazardous events, the likelihood of each hazard's 
occurrence, and analyses the mitigation steps and preventative approaches.  
Based on the aforementioned criteria, Table 1 shows the SRATs that are selected for 
requirements elicitation activity. These techniques must exist in more than one paper to 
prove that the techniques are widely used in practice. 
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Table 1. List of SRATs 
Safety Risk Assessment Technique (SRAT) HAZID HA Basic 
Reference(s) 
Accident Model √ √ [25, 26] 
Cause Consequence Analysis (CCA)  √ [14, 24] 
Common Cause Failure Analysis (CCF) √ √ [14, 24] 
Data Flow Diagram (DFD) √ √ [14, 24] 
Decision Tables (Truth Tables)  √ [24, 40] 
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)  √ [14, 24] 
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) / 
Failure Modes, Effects, Criticality Analysis 
(FMECA) 
√ √ [14, 24] 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)  √ [14, 24] 
Finite State Machine/State Transition Diagrams 
(FSM/STD) 
 √ [14, 24] 
Formal Methods (e.g. Time Petri Nets)  √ [14, 24] 
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) √ √ [14, 24] 
Hazard indices √ √ [29, 30] 
Inspection √ √ [14, 24] 
Markov Model  √ [14, 24] 
Misuse Case √ √ [27, 28] 
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)  √ [4, 18, 20] 
Prototyping √ √ [14, 24] 
Safety Checklist √ √ [23, 24] 
What-if √ √ [21, 22] 
Walkthrough √ √ [14, 24] 
 
Software safety process can be customised to meet specific organisation or project 
needs. However, in general there are several common activities that must be performed 
to ensure that the requirements conform to the safety standards [31].  Similar to the RE 
process, the software safety process also has its own systematic way of capturing 
safety-related requirements. The main activities of the software safety process that 
should be part of the elicitation activity are identified and described as follows: 
2.1.1. Software Safety Planning 
The process starts with a software safety planning which identifies the safety goals [11]. 
For instance, a company plans to reduce accident rate by 15 percent in the following 
five years. This activity involves the planning of safety tasks performed in the project 
and hence produce a safety plan. The objectives of the safety plan are defined 
according to the safety goals.  
2.1.2. Capturing top-level safety-related requirements 
Top-level requirements include the overall system requirements such as hardware, 
software, external devices and constraints of the system. To capture the top–level 
safety-related requirements, the stakeholders need to perform the following steps:-  
 Identify safety-related computer system function and its description such as 
safety functional requirements, safety significant requirements, and constraints.  
 Perform hazard analysis from the scenarios and functional requirements [19]. 
 Perform risk assessment after the potential hazards have been identified. Each 
hazard will be analysed to determine the likelihood of occurrences and the 
level of risks.  
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 Categorise requirements to specific level, for example the requirements can be 
classified into system, hardware, or software levels to show the overall 
association in the requirements. 
 Propose mitigation approaches to each requirement respective to risk level. 
2.1.3. Capturing design-level safety-related requirements 
Capturing design-level safety-related requirements include the following steps:- 
 Perform software specific hazard analysis on software level requirements that 
are defined during top-level safety-related requirements considering the 
possible erroneous conditions such as the interface errors, logic errors, 
calculation or computation errors, or data errors [31]. 
 Perform risk assessment to reassess the risk in software level requirements and 
also determine the Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of the requirements in order to 
evaluate the criticality of each requirement. 
 Propose mitigation approaches to manage the high risk and critical 
requirements based on the risk assessment results. The development teams 
need to decide whether treatment approaches should be proposed in the design. 
2.1.4. Safety Specific Verification and Validation (V&V) 
After the requirements are finalised, it is important for safety and requirements 
engineering teams to validate the correctness and completeness of the elicited safety-
related requirements [10] according to the safety goals defined earlier. Any missing, 
incomplete, ambiguous, and incorrect requirements detected during this activity should 
be corrected. The corrections need to be analysed to ensure that the changes do not 
have negative impact on other requirements. 
2.2. Phase II: Designing a survey to collect data from the experts 
In Phase II, we had conducted a survey using a web-based questionnaire because it was 
more cost-efficient and the respondents can be geographically distributed across 
continents. The objective of the survey was to collect expert opinions in evaluating the 
validity of the selected SRATs and safety activities/steps. We had designed a structured 
questionnaire with close-ended, multiple-choice and open-ended type questions. The 
respondents can provide more detailed feedback in open-ended questions. The 
questionnaire consists of 15 questions.  
It was a challenge to identify respondents for this survey because the respondents 
must have knowledge and expertise in both software safety and requirements 
engineering. We had sent our survey to 50 industry experts and researchers in various 
domains (e.g. aviation, oil and gas, nuclear, energy generation, railway, medical, 
communication and control) that have applied SRATs in eliciting software safety 
requirements. Out of the 50 requests that we sent, 29 experts answered the survey. The 
respondents had different experience levels and work functions in research or private 
sectors (e.g. safety engineers, system architects, technical advisors, process engineers, 
operation manager). 
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2.3. Phase III: Analysing data collected in Phase II 
In Phase III, we analysed the survey data. The analysis results show that there are 93 
percent of the respondents agreed that the requirements elicitation is an important 
activity in safety-related systems. However, there were only 55 percent of the 
respondents adopted a framework for requirements elicitation. Among these 55 percent 
of respondents, the existing industry standards are adopted as a framework and there 
are also guidelines to assist them in their elicitation activity. 
All the techniques identified through literature (Table 1) were selected by the 
practitioners as suitable techniques for requirements elicitation (minimum three 
experts). Also, more than 50% of the experts had voted for the well-established 
techniques (i.e. PHA, safety checklists, FMEA/FMECA, and FTA). This supports the 
validity of the SRATs that we had selected from the literature are appropriate SRATs 
to be integrated into the elicitation activity. 
We also analysed all the responses regarding the safety steps that have been carried 
out by the respondents’ organisations in eliciting safety requirements. All the safety 
steps identified in Phase I are included. Although the respondents only voted for some 
of the steps, all of the steps have been considered as valid steps to be performed during 
requirements elicitation. Among all the steps, identifying safety goals, performing 
hazard analysis, performing risk assessment, and categorising requirements into 
specific levels are the common activities that have been carried out by most of the 
organisations. About 79% of the respondents agreed that integrating SRATs into 
requirements elicitation can help the requirements engineers, safety engineers and 
development teams to improve the elicitation of system and software requirements. 
This helps to develop safer software intensive systems. 
3. Safety Risk Assessment Techniques In Requirements Elicitation (SaTRE) 
Integration Framework 
3.1. Conceptual Metamodel 
A conceptual metamodel of the SaTRE Integration Framework is developed based on 
Software Process Engineering Metamodel (SPEM) which comprises the basic process 
entities: Activity, Work Product and Role. This metamodel is extended by including 
two additional entities, Technique (i.e. SRAT) and Step (i.e. safety step). The 
conceptual metamodel is illustrated in Figure 1. As defined in the SPEM [49], an 
Activity may consist of one or more Step, whereas the Work Product represents the 
deliverables which are produced, used, or modified during the process. Role describes 
the responsibilities of stakeholders for each Work Product and also perform a particular 
Activity. Technique is a systematic procedure used to assist the Activity. 
In this research, the Activity is the safety activity that has been integrated into 
appropriate requirements elicitation stages. Each safety activity consists of one or more 
detailed Steps defined to form the overall software safety process. Work Product is the 
artefact that is either the output of or the input from the safety activities and steps. The 
Role represents the main stakeholders who are responsible for the Work Product and at 
the same time perform the Activity. The Technique represents the SRATs applied to 
assist the stakeholders to perform specific Activity and Step. This metamodel forms the 
basis in designing the SaTRE Integration Framework. The relationships defined 
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between the entities in the metamodel are used to illustrate the activities in 
requirements elicitation. 
 
Figure 1. Conceptual metamodel of the SaTRE Integration Framework (adapted from SPEM [49]). 
 
3.2. SaTRE Integration Framework 
The overview of the SaTRE Integration Framework is shown in Figure 2. The 
requirements elicitation activity is divided into three stages: Pre-elicitation, Midst of 
elicitation, and Post-elicitation. The safety aspects are being considered in the 
requirements elicitation activity by integrating appropriate safety activities and SRATs 
into relevant elicitation stages. The aims of the pre-elicitation stage are identifying  the 
goals and objectives of the project, the scope and system boundaries (e.g. domain) of 
the project and relevant requirements sources. After establishing required information 
from the pre-elicitation stage, the midst of the elicitation stage continues with the aims 
to elicit the existing requirements and the new requirements. The post-elicitation stage 
is carried out when all relevant stakeholders have agreed that there are no additional 
requirements or scenarios to be added. 
In Section 2, a list of safety activities, steps and SRATs were selected. There are 
four main safety activities and each activity comprises a few different steps. These 
activities and steps are incorporated into Pre-elicitation, Midst of elicitation and Post-
elicitation stages. Next, appropriate SRATs are integrated into these safety activities 
and steps. We have compiled a technique repository to store the information of the 
selected SRATs. This repository provides additional guidelines and templates to help 
the requirements and safety engineering teams to understand and apply the SRATs. The 
techniques repository also facilitates safety engineers to select techniques that are 
suitable for elicitation activity in their projects. Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 further 
describe the process of  integrating SRATs into requirements elicitation activity based 
on this framework. 
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Figure . Overview of SaTRE Framework. 
3.3. Assigning Safety Activities and Steps into Relevant Requirements Elicitation Stages 
In this section, we mapped the safety activities/steps into appropriate elicitation 
stages by comparing the similarities of the objectives between requirements elicitation 
activity and the activities in software safety process. Also, we have assigned the safety 
activities to each respective stage according to the inputs and outputs of the safety 
activities.  
The pre-elicitation stage takes place during the initial elicitation activity aims to 
define the project goals, determine the project scope/boundaries, and identify the 
relevant requirements sources of the system. We mapped software safety planning 
activity to this stage because both activities share the same objectives. Next, the midst 
of elicitation stage takes place whereby the existing and new requirements are elicited 
based on the identified requirements sources. We have mapped the safety activities that 
focus on identifying new safety-related requirements and proposing new mitigation 
approaches to this stage. The last stage of the requirements elicitation is the post-
elicitation that validates and verifies the overall system requirements.  From the safety 
aspect, safety specific V&V is performed to ensure that the defined safety-related 
requirements have fulfilled the safety goals. Both activities are mapped together to 
show the collaboration required by all the stakeholders in assuring the correctness and 
completeness of the requirements specification. 
As shown in Figure 3, we integrate the safety activities into appropriate elicitation 
stages to ensure that safety quality is considered throughout the requirements elicitation 
process. Based on the expert opinions and literature survey, we have finalised the steps 
and assigned the software safety steps into the three stages of elicitation activity. This 
2
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helps the stakeholders (e.g. safety engineers, development teams) to understand the 
relationship between the RE and software safety processes. 
 
 
Figure 3. The Mapping Between Requirements Elicitation Stages and Safety Activities/Steps. 
3.4. Integrating SRATs into Safety Activities and Steps 
In this section, the SRATs are integrated into specific safety activities. We studied and 
reviewed the literature to identify the appropriate moment to apply each SRAT in the 
safety activities and steps during requirements elicitation to ensure that software safety 
risks are well identified and managed. Based on the characteristic of each SRAT and 
the objective of each safety activity, the SRATs are assigned to appropriate safety 
activities. Figure 4 shows the mapping between safety activities and techniques.  
 Accident models [28, 29] identify the safety goals by analysing the physical 
factors and design practices that caused the accidents happened in the past. The 
development teams are able to discover flaws in the past practices and assess 
the risks of the system. Thus, this technique can be applied in software safety 
planning, capturing top-level and design-level safety requirements.  
 PHA [22,24] is suggested to be applied during the identification of the safety 
goals because PHA can be used to define, analyse, and describe the hazards in 
the system at the initial stage. Information which is gathered initially such as 
the system boundaries, operational and environmental, and description about 
the system in the pre-elicitation stage.  
 Safety checklists [23, 24] are to extract information from the past projects such 
as safety constraints that need to be considered or implemented in the new 
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project. Therefore, checklists can be used during software safety planning (i.e. 
the preparation of the safety plans), and also capturing top-level and design-
level safety requirements (i.e. hazard analysis).  
 
 
Figure 4. The Mapping Between Safety Activities and SRATs. 
 What-if technique [21, 22] is a cost-effective brainstorming method used by 
stakeholders to analyse hazards and identify missing and incomplete top-level 
and design-level safety-related requirements in the midst of elicitation. 
 To capture the top-level safety-related requirements, FMEA/FMECA [19, 24, 
34, 35] and  HAZOP [24, 36] are some of the SRATs that are commonly 
applied in identifying potential failure modes/deviation causes and its effects 
on other system components, and proposing mitigation actions for that 
particular failure mode.  
 As for FTA [24, 34, 35, 37] and ETA [24, 34, 38], these techniques are used to 
identify the faults/events that would result in system failure and provide the 
probability of each failure. Therefore, both techniques can be applied for 
hazard analysis and risk assessment.  
 The CCF analysis [24, 39] technique analyses the failure of several 
components and systems resulted from a cause or event within the specified 
system boundary. It is suitable to be applied during hazard analysis together 
with FTA that computes the probability of the failure.  
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 During hazard analysis, decision table [24, 40] can be used to analyse the 
situations where a combination of causes and the possible conditions would 
lead to different effects.  
 CCA [19, 24, 41, 42]  identifies the initiating events and conditions that lead to 
different consequences. Subsequently, risk assessment can be performed using 
the results from CCA.  
 Hazard indices [29] provides information about well-known hazards. This 
technique can be used as a quantitative way of measuring the potential hazards. 
Hence, it can be used for hazards analysis and risk determination. 
 For elicitating design-level safety-related requirements, FST/STD [24, 43] and 
Markov model [24, 46, 45] can  be used when the initial designs are available. 
Both techniques can be used to predict the inputs and outputs of the transition 
between the system states. Software specific hazard analysis can be performed 
in early requirement phase to ensure the completeness of requirements.  
 Inspection and walkthroughs [10, 24, 46] are two most widely used SRATs that 
allow stakeholders to verify and validate the correctness of the elicited 
requirements during the post-elicitation stage. 
 Prototyping [24, 46] has been very useful in helping the development teams to 
validate the requirements by detecting the problems and clarify uncertainties in 
certain aspects of the system design.  
 Formal methods [24, 47, 48] are mathematical modeling techniques that 
applied in safety-related systems to validate and verify whether the initial 
design of the systems have satisfied its safety properties.  
 DFD [10, 24] can be used to illustrate the transformation of the input to output 
of data in the system after initial design-level requirements is defined. 
A generic integration of SRATs, safety activities and steps into relevant 
requirements elicitation stages is presented in Appendix. Table 2 also shows the 
mapping of process entities such as work product and roles that are related to the 
SRATs. This helps the requirements or safety engineers to understand who can assists 
in performing the SRATs, and also know the deliverables which are produced, used, or 
modified during the process. A web-based tool (http://satre-tool.somee.com) was 
designed and developed according to the proposed framework to help requirements and 
safety engineers to apply this framework and customise the integration process based 
on individual project’s needs.     
4. Evaluation and Discussion 
For the evaluation of the framework, an online questionnaire was created using Google 
docs and the link was distributed to the safety and RE experts via email. In the email, 
we also included a guideline of the SaTRE Integration Framework and a bibliography 
of the SRATs to help the RE and safety experts to understand and review the proposed 
framework. There are 9 experts reviewed the SaTRE Integration Framework and 
responded to the questionnaire. Five of them are from the safety-related industries (i.e. 
senior system engineers, operational manager, principal software architect, and process 
engineer) and the remaining four are researchers in the area of requirements 
engineering, dependability, and software safety. Based on the analysis results, the 
following are concluded: 
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 Overall expert opinions - Average of the experts have rated the framework in 
the range of moderate to good. Thus, this framework will be used as the basis 
for analysis and developing SaTRE web-based tool. 
 Validity of the mapping - Experts review shows that the mapping of the 
requirements elicitation stages, SRATs, safety activities, and steps involved in 
the proposed framework are valid and acceptable.  
 Applicability–The average response of the experts showed that the generic 
SaTRE Integration Framework can be used and customised for different 
projects. The identified process entities such as the input and output of the 
safety steps and activities, roles and techniques in the software safety process, 
and also the defined relationship between safety activity, techniques and 
requirements elicitation activity can be used to create method fragments to 
customise requirements engineering process. This framework comprises a set 
of SRATs that allows the requirements and safety engineering teams to decide 
which SRATs should be used to elicit software safety requirements in each 
stage. The proposed work can also be used to support the selection approaches 
which help the teams to choose SRATs systematically, e.g. based on a multi-
criteria decision making method.  
 Limitations – The main limitation is that the framework only caters the 
integration of SRATs into requirements elicitation. This research work can be 
extended to integrate the SRATs into other software development life cycle 
phases. 
5. Conclusion and Future Work 
The problem of incompleteness and the incorrectness of software requirements are 
some reasons that caused the software of safety-related systems to fail to achieve their 
safety goals. The two key factors i.e. software safety risks assessment and software 
safety requirements elicitation should be performed to ensure the overall safety of 
software intensive systems. Thus, in this research, SaTRE framework was proposed to 
help the safety and engineering teams to integrate appropriate software safety activities 
and techniques into requirements elicitation activity. The SRATs presented in this 
framework are not domain specific and they are applicable to most of the safety-related 
systems.  
The framework was organised based on the three stages of requirements elicitation 
(pre-elicitation, midst of elicitation, and post-elicitation). Selected SRATs and 
activities were incorporated into the relevant stages of the requirements elicitation. This 
integration framework also can help the teams to choose the techniques that can be 
performed to elicit the specified level of software safety-related requirements. The 
integration is illustrated using a conceptual metamodel can be used to create method 
fragments for safety-related requirements elicitation activity. The expert’s evaluation 
shows that the framework is useful to assist the new requirements and safety engineers 
in eliciting software safety requirements. A generic integration of SRATs, safety 
activities, and steps into requirements elictation was presented where requirements and 
safety engineers may refer if they need more detailed information on the application of 
the SRATs during requirements elicitation. 
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The current work focuses on the elicitation activity. This work could be extended to 
incorporate the safety process into other software development lifecycle phases. 
Subsequently, we will develop a tool to support both requirements and safety engineers 
in applying the proposed framework and providing some guidelines (such as the 
SRATs information, steps, roles and work products) that can help the stakeholders to 
understand the application of the SRATs. 
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Appendix 
Table 2. A Generic Integration of SRATs into Requirements Elicitation Stages based on the SaTRE 




Safety Activities SRATs Basic 
Reference 
Step Work Product 
(Input, Output) 
Role 
Pre-elicitation Software Safety 
Planning 
Identify safety goals 
PHA [22-24] - Input 






System boundaries  
Output 







[23, 24] - 
Accident 
models 


























and its description 
2. Perform hazard 
analysis 










PHA [22-24] 1,2 Input 
Artefacts, Safety 
plans, Safety goals, 






Probability of failure, 
Likelihood/ 














FTA [24, 34] 2,3 
ETA [24, 34] 2,3 
HAZOP [24, 36] 2,5 
What-if [22] 1,2 
CCF [24, 39] 2 
CCA [15, 24] 2,3 
Safety 
checklists  
[23, 24] 1 
Decision table [24, 40] 2 









1. Perform software 
specific hazard 
analysis 









PHA [22-24] 1 Input 
Safety plan, Safety 

























[34, 35] 1,2,3 
FTA [24, 34] 1,2 
ETA [24, 34] 1,2 
HAZOP [24, 36] 1,3 
What-if [22] 1 
FSM/STD [24, 43] 1 
Markov Model [44, 47] 1,2 
CCF  [24, 39] 1 
CCA [15, 24] 1,2 
Safety 
checklists 
[23, 24] 1 
Decision table [24, 40] 1 
Misuse Case [27] 1,3 
Accident 
models 
















Inspection  [10, 24] - Input 
Safety goals, Safety 
plan, System/ Safety-
related  requirements, 











Walkthroughs [10, 24] - 
Prototyping/ 
Simulation 
[24, 46] - 
Safety 
checklists 
[23, 24] - 
Formal 
methods 
[24, 47] - 
DFD [10, 24] - 
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